The answer to whether or not unemployment benefits are dischargeable in bankruptcy hinges on the following:  1) whether the state receives adequate notice of the bankruptcy filing; 2) whether the state upon proper notice brings a timely complaint (adversarial proceeding) in the bankruptcy court, and 3) whether the state wins its complaint and proves that the debtor obtained the unemployment overpayment by fraud or theft as opposed to having made a reasonable mistake.

A debt that is discharged in bankruptcy is a debt that is no longer enforceable.  The general rule is that a debt is dischargeable at the conclusion of a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case absent some specific statutory provision to the contrary.  The exceptions to discharge are primarily enumerated in sections 523, 727, 1228 and 1328 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Some of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are “self-executing” excluding a debt from discharge automatically even if the creditor does not challenge the dischargeability of the underlying debt.  Specifically these sections include, 11U.S.C. §523(a)(1), (3), (5), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (16), (17), (18), or (19).   However, other provisions of the bankruptcy code require that the creditor file a separate complaint known as an adversarial proceeding within a strict time frame otherwise the underlying debt is discharged.   The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that might bar the discharge of an overpayment of state unemployment benefits are not self-executing.  These three provisions fall under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), (6), and (15).  Of these provisions only 523(a)(2) and  (a)(4) would seem applicable.  These two provisions are known as the “fraud” provisions.  Accordingly in order for the state to prevail in excluding unemployment overpayments from discharge, they must prevail in a timely filed fraud complaint brought in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.

In general, a complaint to determine the dischargeability of debt under § 523(a)(2), or (4), must be filed not later than sixty days after the first date set for the creditors meeting. Parties must have at least thirty days’ notice of this deadline. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c).   However the state would need to be given proper notice so that they would have the opportunity to file a complaint and challenge the dischargeability of the overpayment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3). This is why it is extremely important that all creditors be properly listed on the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules.

Again, there are two provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section 523 that if successfully brought by the state seeking to recover an unemployment overpayment claim would bar the discharge of the debt under the Bankruptcy Code.  The first such provision is found under 523(a)(2).

Section 523(a)(2) excepts from discharge debts incurred in obtaining money, property, or services by false pretense or fraud.  Accordingly, the debtor who knowingly made a false statement on his unemployment application or continuing unemployment forms would be excepted from discharge under this provision provided the state timely brought and proved their complaint.  A debtor who could prove that they reasonably believed that they were entitled to the overpayment money would prevail and be entitled to discharge the debt.

The other applicable exception would come under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(4).  This provision bars a discharge where the plaintiff proves fraud or defalcation while the defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity, or committed embezzlement, or larceny.  These provisions would be applicable if the state were able to prove that you received an unemployment benefit by means of what is commonly known as theft.  Again, the state would have to timely file their complaint and prove that that is what happened.

In conclusion, at least in California in my experience rarely does the state when properly notified challenge the overpayment by timely bringing an adversarial complaint.  Accordingly, it is critically important that the overpayment claim be listed on the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and that notice to the state be properly addressed.  For California overpayments you would want to notice  Employment Development Department, State of California, Bankruptcy Unit – MIC 92E, P.O. Box 826880, Sacramento, CA 94280.  In the event that the state brings a timely complaint, the debtor/ defendant in consultation with his bankruptcy attorney must decide if reasonable defenses exist to the state’s claim and the costs and benefits of defending the claim.  Unless the facts tilt in favor of debtor / defendant it may be advisable to work out a settlement with a repayment plan.  For more information contact San Diego bankruptcy attorney Raymond Schimmel at (619) 275-1250 or at http://www.endbillcollections.com.

 

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Motion For Relief In Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

by Jay Fleischman on October 10, 2011

When you file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, an automatic stay is put in place.  This is the legal mechanism that stops foreclosure, repossession and collection efforts including wage garnishments. This can be a great relief for you. You can take a breath and work on reorganizing your priorities and assets.

However, under certain circumstances, creditors can ask the court to allow them to go ahead with collections in spite of the bankruptcy filing.  This is called a Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay, and a successful one often negates the whole purpose of filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the first place.

These motions are most often filed by mortgage companies and car loan lenders, but any creditor can file a Motion for Relief if they have a compelling reason to resume collection efforts before your Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is otherwise completed.

The Court may grant creditors relief from the stay if they can produce evidence that you will be putting their collateral at risk or that you are unable to continue satisfactory payments on the collateral. If you defaulted on your mortgage seem unable to cure past due payments or continue making payments, the mortgage company may decide to file a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay. Automobile lenders who feel you are putting the vehicle at risk, such as failing to maintain insurance coverage or purposely putting the vehicle at risk of damage, would file for relief in order to repossess the car and protect their collateral.

In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the creditor typically wants to be sure that it will get full value for the asset when the repossess it.  The major concern is that you’re holding onto a car (for example) and not paying for it – if you crack it up during the Chapter 7 bankruptcy process then the bank is going to get stuck with a worthless car and you’re going to walk away from the debt once the discharge is issued.

The motion for relief, therefore, is the creditor’s way of getting things moving forward quickly rather than having to wait until the Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge is issued.  It’s a means of evening the scales and making things are fair to both parties as possible.

If the Bankruptcy Court grants the motion, then the company is allowed to pursue collection action against you to claim the asset, such as initiating a foreclosure proceeding or repossessing an automobile. However, there are ways of avoiding foreclosure of your home or repossession of your vehicle, even after that process has begun and whether you are in bankruptcy or not. Your attorney should be able to help you.

Jay S. Fleischman is a consumer bankruptcy lawyer who sues creditors and bill collectors for harassment after bankruptcy. When not helping people with bill problems, he works with attorneys to help improve their law firm marketing efforts.

The simplistic answer to the question of whether you have to file bankruptcy jointly when you are married is no.  You can choose to bankruptcy individually.  However, whether or not this is the best decision depends on a number of factors and often involves detailed legal and factual analysis tailored to the individual situation.

First off, my discussion of this topic is limited strictly to California bankruptcy filings.  California is a community property state with unique exemption laws.  My analysis would not necessarily be appropriate in states that have different property and exemption laws.

Whether you decide to file bankruptcy with your spouse or not will depend on a number of factors as follows:

1)      were the debts incurred jointly;

2)      does one of the spouses have separate vs. community property;

3)      are there issues because one spouse is ineligible for a bankruptcy discharge;

4)      is an objective of the bankruptcy junior lien avoidance on a jointly owned property;

5)      is it possible for one spouse to preserve a good credit rating;

6)      particularly with regard to Chapter 13 bankruptcy are the spouses amicable with one another;

7)      must one spouse maintain a security clearance;

8)      Will an exemption waiver create a problem;

9)      and what are the attributes and characteristics of each spouses obligations and liabilities

Let me start by saying that when you are married and you file for bankruptcy without your spouse your spouse will still be involved in the process to some extent.  If you are living with a non-filing spouse their income is still considered in the means test determination for the filing spouse.  For Chapter 7 the non-filing spouse’s income is generally combined with the filing spouse to arrive at current monthly income.  If the combined income exceeds the median income for your household size, and you and your spouse don’t have the right mix of necessary expenses, you may not qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy your ability to repay is based on your household budget.  So even if only one spouse files for bankruptcy, the other spouse’s income and expenses are considered in determining the repayment obligation of the spouse who has filed for bankruptcy.  In addition the filing spouses exemption choices are limited if the non-filing spouse does not file an exemption wavier.  For the issues involving spousal waivers and how they may affect  a non-filing spouse see my blog post on this issue.

The benefit of having one spouse filing without the other may come from the fact that the non-filing spouse can preserve their credit (assuming that it is not already shot) and even make credit purchases for the household solely in their name that might not otherwise be possible.  In addition the non-filing spouse may in the future have their own individual need to file for bankruptcy and unavoidable future debts from an illness or loss of a job.  If they are not a party to the bankruptcy all of their separate bankruptcy options are kept open.

On the other hand if the debts are incurred jointly the creditors may go after the non-filing spouse for the balances that were discharged by the bankruptcy.  With that said, the creditors remedies may be limited to levy against the non-filing spouses separate property with the analysis of that issue being outside the scope of this discussion.  Even so, the debt collectors can continue to call to demand money from the non-filing spouse for the joint debt or his or her separate debts.  This in itself can be quite disconcerting for a couple looking for a fresh start.  I also will leave for a future discussion the situation where the spouses are living apart.  This creates a whole variety of unique issues and problems. Even with this situation, under the right conditions and careful consideration a joint bankruptcy might be possible and advisable.  I touch on some of these issues in my blog article about spousal waivers.

In the end careful legal analysis tailored to the facts and an individual couple’s needs and objectives is required.  You should discuss with qualified counsel your objectives and the respective consequences of filing jointly or not given your family’s specific circumstances.

For more information contact San Diego Attorney Raymond Schimmel

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What Client’s Need To Know to Avoid Hiring A Bankruptcy Mill

by Raymond M. Schimmel on September 20, 2011

Bankruptcy mills are high volume law practices that advertise aggressively and provide poor quality legal services.  Typical attributes of a bankruptcy mill are as follows:

a)  rely heavily on poorly supervised non-attorney staff; b) lack adequate controls over workflow (correspondence to 3rd parties & clients) and court deadlines; c)  cut corners both ethically and substantively; d) minimal attorney involvement; e) routinely fail to file necessary documents, and frequently show up to hearings unprepared, and f) Have usually been admonished by the court on more than one occasion.

Unfortunately, with bankruptcy filings soaring, many unaware consumers have turned to “bankruptcy mills” for help with their financial difficulties.  Most “bankruptcy mills” advertise heavily on television and radio while flooding homeowners in foreclosure with direct mail.  When a consumer chooses a “bankruptcy mill” they assume that they will be working closely with a lawyer on their case.  However, with bankruptcy mills, this is often not the case.  The economics are such that with a mill they have a very high ratio of cases to attorneys.  I have seen “bankruptcy mills” that literally have hundreds of open cases for each attorney working at the firm.

While the consumer might initially meet with an “attorney intake coordinator” who will sign them up, the intake coordinator rarely spends more than a few minutes with the client.  Rather their focus is to get a down payment with a signed retainer agreement. Once the retainer agreement has been signed the client is handed off to a “prep team.” The “prep” team usually consists of poorly supervised staff consisting of paralegals, law clerks and secretaries.

The “prep team” will gather necessary documents (usually with little or no attorney review) and prepare the bankruptcy petition and schedules to be filed in a cookie cutter fashion often omitting important disclosures and details.  The client will then be asked to come in and sign the often deficient papers.  Frequently the final signing is not supervised by an attorney.  This means that last minute questions or issues brought up by the client often go unaddressed.

The case is then filed and assigned to an attorney.  Often the attorney assigned to the case has never met the client. Frequently, In a Chapter 7 case the client goes to their 341 meeting of creditors only to find that they and their assigned attorney are playing “blind man’s bluff.”  In other words, the “bankruptcy mill” attorney will wander through the crowded hearing room trying to figure out which of the attendees are his or her clients.  Similarly, the “bankruptcy mill” clients will be looking for the attorney that they have never met while wondering whether they have been abandoned.  When the case is called, often the trustee is asking questions for which the assigned “mill” attorney is completely unfamiliar.  Many of these cases are continued for no other reason than the client was poorly prepped for the hearing or that  their assigned attorney is unprepared to answer obvious questions that should have been apparent if there had been continuity from the start of the case.  In other cases, clients lose their property or wind up charged with nondisclosure and felony bankruptcy fraud because of a break-down of communication with their attorney.   For an example of serious problems that arise from inadequate bankruptcy representation see my blog article “I Wish I had a Time Machine.”

As problems frequently arise with “bankruptcy mill” attorneys in Chapter 7, similar problems also arise in Chapter 13.  In a Chapter 13 case the problems and objections also often arise because of the lack of continuity in the way the case was prepared.  Inherently, without adequate communication between attorney and client the “bankruptcy mill” staff will have made many assumptions (often cookie cutter) rather than annoying a hopelessly over-burdened “mill” boss.  These assumptions along with an improper application of the law will often prompt a Chapter 13 trustee’s objection to confirmation of the client’s bankruptcy plan.  In some cases these problems can be fixed causing only inexcusable anxiety for the client and in other cases they cause the case to be dismissed with serious consequences for the client.

In conclusion it is important that you hire a firm where you can reasonably expect that you can get to know your attorney.  Your attorney should be reasonably available to answer your questions, review your documents and the preparation of your case, and to represent you at all trustee and court hearings. In many cases a consumer in need of personal bankruptcy case will get better representation with a well experienced attorney with a strong reputation and a manageable volume of cases.

 

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Chapter 13 Trustees Are Challenging the $200 Old Car Allowance

by Raymond M. Schimmel on September 9, 2011

A new Chapter 13 controversy is brewing over whether a debtor can take an additional $200 “Old Car” operating allowance on the means test for paid-off vehicles that are more than six (6) model years old or that have more than 75,000 miles.  While the United States Trustee has generally conceded the issue, a number of Chapter 13 trustees have not.  In the Southern District of California where I practice, one of our Chapter 13 trustees has joined the new trend in trying to challenge the extra “Old Car” operating allowance.

Recently this issue has increased in significance since the Supreme Court had decided Ransom v. FIA Card Services.  In Ransom the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) held that a debtor may not take an ownership allowance on a paid-off vehicle.  Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 562 U. S. ____ (2011).    So if you are not able to take the “Old Car” allowance it’s a double whammy.  You cannot set aside an expense for replacement (“ownership allowance”) and you probably have a vehicle that is out of warranty and more costly in repairs and maintenance.

Prior to the Ransom decision there was a split of authority between the federal circuit courts as to whether a debtor could take an ownership allowance (currently $496) on a vehicle that had already been paid-off prior to their filing for bankruptcy.   The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits said that you could take the allowance and the majority of the other circuits did not so permit.

In an effort to be fair to debtors with older model paid cars the Executive Office of the United States Trustee  (“EOUST”) has had a policy in place to allow  an additional “old car” operating allowance of $200.  This policy was not derived from the direct language of the bankruptcy law but in reference to Internal Revenue Collection Standards from which the “Means Test” expense standards were drawn.  In furtherance of the Internal Revenue Collection Standards, and to help guide field collection agents, the Internal Revenue Agency distributes an Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) to its field offices.  The IRM is not a legally binding document but is generally followed by the IRS and carries some persuasive authority with the courts. Similarly, the EOUST has a “Statement of the U.S. Trustee’s Position on Legal Issues Arising Under the Chapter 13 Disposable Income Test,” that is their guiding policy guidance to the Regional United States Trustees but is not legally binding

The IRM states as follows:

I.R.M. 5.8.5.20.3  (10-22-2010)
Transportation Expenses

  1. Transportation expenses are considered necessary when they are used by taxpayers and their families to provide for their health and welfare and/or the production of income. Employees investigating OICs are expected to exercise appropriate judgment in determining whether claimed transportation expenses meet these standards. Expenses that appear excessive should be questioned and, in appropriate situations, disallowed.
  2. The transportation standards consist of nationwide figures for loan or lease payments referred to as ownership costs and additional amounts for operating costs broken down by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area. Operating costs include maintenance, repairs, insurance, fuel, registrations, licenses, inspections, parking and tolls.
  3. Ownership Expenses – Expenses are allowed for purchase or lease of a vehicle. Taxpayers will be allowed the local standard or the amount actually paid, whichever is less, unless the taxpayer provides documentation to verify and substantiate that the higher expenses are necessary. Generally, auto loan or lease payments will not continue as allowed expenses after the terms of the loan/lease have been satisfied. However, depending on the age or condition of the vehicle, the complete disallowance of the ownership expense may result in a transportation expense allowance that does not adequately meet the necessary expenses of the taxpayer. See paragraph (5) below for the definition and allowances of an older vehicle.
  4. Operating Expenses – Allow the full operating costs portion of the local transportation standard, or the amount actually claimed by the taxpayer, whichever is less, unless the taxpayer provides documentation to verify and substantiate that the higher expenses are necessary. Substantiation for this allowance is not required.
  5. In situations where the taxpayer has a vehicle that is currently over six years old or has reported mileage of 75,000 miles or more, an additional monthly operating expense of $200 will generally be allowed per vehicle.

Example:

(1) The taxpayer who has a 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier with 50,000 miles, will be allowed the standard of $231 per month plus $200 per month operating expense (because of the age of the vehicle), for a total operating expense allowance of $431 per month.

Example:

(2) The taxpayer has a 1995 Ford Taurus, with 90,000 reported miles. The vehicle was bought used, and the auto loan will be fully paid in 30 months, at $300 per month. In this situation, the taxpayer will be allowed the ownership expense until the loan is fully paid; i.e., $300 plus the allowable operating expense of $231 per month, for a total transportation allowance of $531 per month. After the auto loan is “retired” in 30 months, the ownership expense is not applicable; however, at that point, the taxpayer will be allowed a $200 operating expense allowance, in addition to the standard $231, for a total operating expense allowance of $431 per month.

  1. If a taxpayer claims higher amounts of operating costs because he commutes long distances to reach his place of employment, he may be allowed greater than the standard. The additional operating expense would generally meet the production of income test and therefore be allowed if the taxpayer provides substantiation.
  2. If the amount claimed is more than the total allowed by any of the transportation standards, the taxpayer must provide documentation to verify and substantiate that those expenses are necessary. All deviations from the transportation standards must be verified, reasonable and documented in the case history.

 

In opposition to the IRM and the Statement of the U.S. Trustee’s Position on Legal Issues Arising Under the Chapter 13 Disposable Income Test guidance some Chapter 13 trustees’ are still arguing against the “Old Car” allowance.  The Chapter 13 trustees in large part are relying on three post Ransom cases.

In the first of these cases, In re Hargis,  the court denied the claim on the basis that this additional allowance is not in the standards table incorporated by 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).  The court noted that an additional $200 vehicle operating expense deduction is neither in the Local Standards nor in the Collection Financial Standards.  The court therefore  concluded that “as a matter of statutory interpretation… the $200 additional operating expense is not an expense specified under the …Local Standards with the meaning of  § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).   In re Hargis, ___ B.R._____, 2011 WL 165123 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011).

In a similar case, Van Dyke, the court disallowed the additional operating expense deduction in part for the reason that the amount referred to in the guideline is not an applicable monthly expense amount specified under the Local Standards as required by the statute.  For that reason the court held that the allowance of this additional amount set forth in the guidelines would be inconsistent with the statute.  Making reference to the Supreme Court’s observation in Ransom about the role of the guidelines, the court concluded that “allowance of an additional amount as set forth in the IRS guidelines is not a matter of interpretation of the Local Standards for transportation, but one of its revision.”  Van Dyke, 2011 WL1833186.

In the final case,  In re Schultz, the court reasons that even if it were to utilize the guidance contained in the IRM, it would not necessarily produce the result that the Debtors would urge.  The court noted that the additional expense is generally, but not universally allowed.  Accordingly, it is discretionary.  Additionally the IRS applies Local Standards as caps on expenditures asserted by taxpayers, not as allowances.  Accordingly, the Debtors would only be entitled to the amount specified in the standard or their actual expenses, whichever is less.  The court went on to conclude since the amount was less on Schedule J for operating expenses than on Form B22C that the Debtors were only eligible for the lesser amount on Schedule J.  In re Schultz Case No. 11-40490-JWV-13, (W.D. of Missouri, June 2011).

In support of the IRM and the Statement of the U.S. Trustee’s Position on Legal Issues Arising Under the Chapter 13 Disposable Income Test guidance some debtors counsel have successfully argued in favor of the “Old Car” allowance in the following cases.

In the case of 10-61317_In_Re_Baker, the court supports its decision to allow the “old car” allowance based on the Justice Kagan’s response to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Ransom.  Justice Kagan for writing for the majority states, “Because the dissent appears to misunderstand our use of the Collection Financial Standards, and because it may be important for future cases to be clear on this point [emphasis and underlining added], we emphasize again that the statute does not “incorporate” or otherwise “import” the IRS guidance. Post, at 730, 732 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The dissent questions what possible basis except incorporation could justify our consulting the IRS’s view, post, at 732, n., but we think that basis obvious: The IRS creates the National and Local Standards referenced in the statute, revises them as it deems necessary, and uses them every day.  The agency might, therefore, have something insightful and persuasive (albeit not controlling) to say about them.”  In re Baker, Case No. 10-61317-13 (D. Montana, February 9, 2011).

Other cases that have found the IRM as persuasive in finding for special circumstances and allowance of the expense are as follows:  In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 310 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007), In re O’Conner, No. 08-60641-13, 2008 WL 4516374, at *13 (Bankr. D. Mont. September 30, 2008), In re Carlin, 348 B.R. 795, 798 (Bankr. D. Or., 2006), In re Wilson, 383 B.R. 729, 734 (8th Cir. Bap 2008).

In conclusion, the extra $200 “Old Car” allowance should not be considered a given in a Chapter 13 case. In reviewing the appropriateness of the expense courts are looking to see whether or not the extra expense is a special circumstance.  While the IRM may be have some persuasive value, debtor’s counsel should also be prepared to substantiate their estimation of why the allowance accurately reflects the anticipated additional operating expenses for an older high mileage car that in all likelihood is out of warranty.  Counsel should also know that where there is a discrepancy between the B22 allowance and the actual Schedule J expense many courts are disinclined to allow the extra expense.  If the expense is claimed on B22C,  the additional operating expense as expected should also be properly reflected on Schedule J.

For Bankruptcy Assistance in San Diego please contact Raymond Schimmel

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Prepared for the Insolvency Law Committee – Business Law Section of the State Bar of California by Zev Shechtman of Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP, in Los Angeles, California

Two recent cases from the Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal highlight the importance of full disclosure of causes of action as assets in debtors’ bankruptcy schedules. Failure by a debtor to schedule a claim could mean that the former debtor as plaintiff will be estopped from litigating that claim, Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1602 (June 1, 2011) [see immediately below], or that the former debtor will lack standing to pursue the claim. M&M Foods, Inc. v. Pacific Am. Fish Co., 196 Cal. App. 4th 554 (June 10, 2011) [second case summary below].

Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1602 (June 1, 2011).

In this case, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint brought by husband and wife borrowers (“plaintiffs”) against lender (“defendant”), among other reasons, on grounds of res judicata and judicial estoppel because plaintiffs failed to disclose the existence of their claims against defendant in the husband’s earlier bankruptcy case.

The plaintiffs purchased their home in January 2007. A notice of default was recorded on their mortgage in September 2007. They entered into a forbearance agreement with the lender in December 2007. Over the following months, plaintiffs failed to make most of their loan payments.

On August 12, 2008, the husband (or “debtor”) filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. He scheduled the lender as holding a secured claim of approximately $688,000. However, he failed to list on his schedules any claim against or any right to a setoff against lender.

On February 2, 2009, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor’s third amended Chapter 13 plan. The plan called for plaintiffs to make post-confirmation monthly mortgage payments to the lender and to cure all prepetition arrearages through monthly payments.

Plaintiffs defaulted on payments under their Chapter 13 plan. On September 28, 2009, they filed the complaint against the lender. In their second amended complaint, filed on February 10, 2010, plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and violation of foreclosure statutes.

The lender filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint, asserting that the claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel, because plaintiffs did not disclose the existence of their claims against the lender in the earlier bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court took judicial notice of the papers filed in debtor’s bankruptcy case and sustained the demurrer. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1988), wherein the court found that a debtor’s failure to disclose a lender liability claim in its chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings precluded the debtor from later litigating the claim on grounds of equitable and judicial estoppel.

The Court of Appeal in Hamilton found that because the debtor declared under penalty of perjury that his bankruptcy schedules were true and correct, yet failed to list his claims against the lender, one of his major creditors, in the same schedules when answering a direct question regarding counterclaims and setoffs, the debtor was barred under the principles of res judicata and judicial estoppel from later pursuing claims against the lender whose alleged wrongful conduct precipitated the bankruptcy.

M&M Foods, Inc. v. Pacific Am. Fish Co., 196 Cal. App. 4th 554 (June 10, 2011).

M&M Foods is another recent decision from the Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal, which also addressed the significance of a debtor’s failure to schedule, or to fully and accurately schedule, a claim.

M&M Foods, M&M Foods (“debtor” or “plaintiff”) entered into an asset purchase agreement with Pacific American Fish (“defendant”) in March 2004, which included an arbitration clause. The asset purchase agreement required that defendant collect accounts receivable for plaintiff through September 2004. Debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in July 2005. On its bankruptcy schedules, debtor listed its “interest in collections from accounts receivable from former business activities.” Debtor’s bankruptcy case was closed in April 2006.

Some time later, former debtor as plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for conversion. Plaintiff alleged that defendant collected $700,000 in accounts receivable that it was required but failed to deliver to plaintiff under the asset purchase agreement. Plaintiff petitioned the trial court to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause of the asset purchase agreement.

Defendant argued and the trial court agreed that plaintiff lacked standing to compel arbitration because only the Chapter 7 trustee had standing to pursue the underlying claims and the attendant arbitration provisions.

On appeal, plaintiff argued that although the $700,000 claim arose prepetition, and was thus property of the estate, the claim was abandoned by the Chapter 7 trustee and reverted to the debtor-plaintiff at the close of the bankruptcy case.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that, in its bankruptcy schedules, plaintiff as debtor did not mention the asset purchase agreement or defendant, “much less the accounts receivable [defendant] was obligated to collect on behalf of [plaintiff] under that agreement.” If the schedules were intended to include the accounts receivable to be collected by defendant under the asset purchase agreement, debtor’s schedules had to clearly express that intent. “The vagueness of the listing supports a finding that the $700,000 accounts receivable claim asserted in [plaintiff's] complaint was not scheduled adequately in [plaintiff's] bankruptcy proceeding.” Since the claim was not adequately scheduled, it was not abandoned by the trustee. Thus, the trial court properly found that plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the arbitration clause of the asset purchase agreement.

For Bankruptcy Assistance in San Diego Please Contact Attorney Raymond Schimmel

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California allows a debtor to pick between two different sets of bankruptcy exemptions, and the chosen set of exemptions must be used exclusively.  One set of exemptions protects debtors against judgment creditors.  This is referred to as the “regular exemptions” and is found in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 703.010 to 704.995, excluding §703.140(b).  The other set of exemptions resembles the federal bankruptcy exemptions and is found at Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §703.140(b).  These are commonly referred to as the “special bankruptcy exemptions.”

The most significant of the differences between the two sets of exemptions is that “regular exemptions” allow a large homestead exemption to be applied towards protecting the equity in the debtor’s residence.  The homestead exemption varies in value between $75,000 and $175,000 depending on the debtor’s age, marital status, disability, income, and dependents.   On the other hand, the “special exemptions” limit the homestead to $23,250, but unlike the regular exemptions any portion of the unused homestead may be applied to any other property that the debtor owns; this feature is often called the “wildcard exemption.”   On many occasions where a debtor does not have significant equity in their personal residence the “special exemptions” will better protect the debtor’s property.

Married debtors who are filing bankruptcy without their spouse and want to use the “special exemptions” must sign along with their non-filing spouse  a “Spousal Waiver” pursuant to §703.140(a)(2).   The Spousal Waiver specifies that the non-filing spouse waives their right to use the “regular exemptions” as well as non-California state or federal exemptions that might otherwise be available where the non-filing spouse resides or has resided outside of California during the time the filing spouse’s bankruptcy is pending.  In other words, if the non-filing spouse later files a bankruptcy and their spouse’s case is still open they are limited to using the “special exemptions.”  So for example, where both spouses have signed a spousal waiver if the first filing spouse has claimed the maximum exemption for designated assets in the amount of $23,250  under §703.140(b)(5) the other spouse if they should subsequently file may not designate any additional assets exempt under §703.140(b)(5).  The subsequent filing spouse is limited to using any left-over §703.140(b) balances that were not already claimed by their spouse in their currently pending case.  A good discussion and example of the hardship that may arise for a subsequently filing spouse can be found in the Eastern District of California case,  In re Celestino Aguilar, Case No.  03-60549-A-7, (Bankr. E.D. CA., 2005).

While the average Chapter 7 case might only stay open for a few months, some Chapter 7 cases may be kept open much longer if there is a benefit to that may be gained by the trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.  In addition cases filed under Chapter 13 and under Chapter 11 or subsequently so converted may stay open for several years significantly increasing the potential for hardship to the non-filing spouse.

In a majority of cases the debtor who is thinking about filing for bankruptcy without their spouse can get the non-filing spouse to sign the “spousal waiver,” without posing any hardship on the non-filing spouse.   This is particularly so in view of the fact that most routine Chapter 7 with few assets will only remain open for a few months.  Once their spouse’s case is closed the non-filing spouse no longer faces any restrictions on their use of exemptions if they subsequently need to file for bankruptcy.  In addition signing the “spousal waiver” may help the non-filing spouse by allowing the filing spouse to get a fresh start and keep necessary assets that will be needed for their support and the support of dependent children.

On occasion however serious problems arise.  Perhaps the non-filing spouse cannot be found or the spouses are not on speaking terms.  On other occasions, it may not be in the non-filing spouse’s best interest to sign the “spousal waiver.”  This is one reason why it is not advisable to give advice regarding the waiver to the non-filing spouse when you are representing the filing spouse.

First, you find pro se cases, or cases where the debtor has been improperly advised by counsel, where no “spousal waiver” has been signed and the “special exemptions” have been claimed.  The bankruptcy trustee will invariably object to the “special exemptions” being improperly claimed.  In the court where I practice (Southern District of California) the trustee will insist on being given a copy of the signed “spousal waiver” in every applicable case.  Where there is an unavailable or un-cooperative non-filing spouse the bankruptcy schedules will need to be amended.  The “special exemptions” will need to be replaced with the “regular exemptions.”  This might mean that some of the debtor’s property may no longer be adequately covered by claimed exemptions.  The resulting non-exempt property may accordingly be sold by the bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.  This will often result in an unhappy debtor losing their paid for automobiles or otherwise exempt savings.  This is why competent counsel will insist on having the “spousal waiver” in the file prior to the bankruptcy case being filed unless the client has made an informed decision to choose the “regular exemptions” rather than the “special exemptions.”  As a practical matter where a “spousal waiver” cannot be obtained, some debtors may rather forego filing bankruptcy altogether.

Sometimes there is also an issue where the signing of the “spousal waiver “ is not in the best interest of the non-filing spouse.  Let me give you an example from a case I had a few years back.  The husband and wife were in the midst of a messy divorce.  The wife was filing bankruptcy and needed a spousal waiver to protect the net equity (after deducting hypothetical selling and administrative costs) of about $20,000 in a condominium rental that she had inherited as her separate property.  The husband on the other hand had no plans for filing bankruptcy, but he was jointly liable on most of the credit card debt.  When he presented his attorney with the “spousal waiver,” his attorney advised that if wife’s rental property were liquidated by the bankruptcy trustee the proceeds would go towards paying off the joint debt and reduce his liability.  I was unable to convince the husband’s counsel that the payment amount toward the joint debt would be small after the administrative expenses of the estate were paid.  Ultimately we waited until the divorce was finalized and then filed the case claiming the “special exemptions.”

A colleague of mine has given me an even more significant example of why it might not be in the non-filing spouse’s best interest to sign a spousal waiver.  Take the situation where the separated wife resides in Florida and may claim Florida’s unlimited homestead exemption on a residence that she inherited as her separate property.  If she agrees to sign a spousal waiver and her husband files for Chapter 13 she may be precluded from using her Florida homestead if she subsequently needs to file for bankruptcy.  Having to wait five years may not be acceptable.  In the alternative the wife may not be willing or able to get a divorced finalized in a timely fashion to prevent some adverse consequence from not filing bankruptcy right away.

In conclusion, the spousal waiver issue should be worked out in advance of a bankruptcy filing.  Where a waiver cannot be obtained in an applicable case that is already pending the § 703.140(b) can be invalidated upon a timely objection by the trustee with undesirable consequences.  Accordingly, where a “spousal waiver” is needed a fully executed form should be in the file before the client’s case is ever filed.  Where a “spousal waiver” cannot be obtained the debtor will need to understand the consequences of having to use the “regular exemptions” in advance of the case being filed. In addition, for those representing a non-filing spouse the pros and cons of signing the “spousal waiver” should be carefully considered.  The analysis will ultimately depend on the likely length of the filing spouse’s case, the potential exemption needs of the non-filing spouse, and the joint benefit that the non-filing spouse may receive in reducing the burdens for their spouse and dependents.

For bankruptcy assistance contact Ray Schimmel, Esq. at (619) 275-1250

http://www.endbillcollections.com

 

For those who have never before heard of ChexSystems before a short explanation is in order.  ChexSystems is a credit reporting agency much like Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion.  While Experian, Equifax and TransUnion report information to subscribers about credit and payment histories,  ChexSystems reports information about negative checking account experiences.  Approximately 80% of all banks and credit unions subscribe to the ChexSystems network.  Banks rely on the ChexSystems network primarily to help them screen applicants for new accounts, particularly checking accounts.  Checking accounts don’t generate much money for banks; many institutions offer them for free in hopes of enticing a depositor to invest in other bank products and services.  However, checking accounts can expose banks to considerable fraud and eat into their profits.  Accordingly, most ChexSystems subscribers will not allow a prospective depositor to open a new bank account if there is a negative ChexSystems report.

How does ChexSystems track the data?  If  a bank account is closed because of too many overdrafts by  a ChexSystems Network member they will report that the account was closed “with cause.”  Similarly ChexSystems offers a check verification system for merchants, so when a check is  “bounced” at the grocery store this too may wind up on the report.

Negative items may appear in a ChexSystems account for five years, warning banks, lenders and even prospective employers that an applicant could pose a credit risk.  A bad ChexSystems report can haunt a person for a long time.

The first thing a person should do when faced with a negative ChexSystems account is to order a free copy of their report.  A report can be ordered at https://www.consumerdebit.com/consumerinfo/us/en/chexsystems/report/index.htm.

After the free report is received, it should  be reviewed for accuracy.  Inaccurate information should be disputed.  For example if  an NSF account was paid off, the report should reflect that the account is paid.  Similarly if an NSF item was discharged in bankruptcy the report should reflect that the account was discharged in bankruptcy and the balance is now zero.

Incorrect information can be disputed by sending a letter to the reporting bank or merchant and a corresponding letter to ChexSystems. ChexSystems mailing address for disputes is as follows: ChexSystems, Inc., 7805 Hudson Road, Suite 100, Woodbury, MN 55125.  With the correspondence should be included a copy of your driver’s license number and social security number. Also a copy of the report with the disputed item along with an explanation of why the item is being disputed should be included along with any supporting documents.  For example you should include a receipt or statement showing that an NSF item was made good.  Similarly if you have filed bankruptcy, you should include  a copy of your bankruptcy discharge order along with the bankruptcy schedules listing the discharged item.  Under federal law, ChexSystems upon receipt of your correspondence  has 30 days to investigate the dispute.  If they cannot verify the disputed item within 30 days, they must remove it from your report.

If the negative information in your ChexSystems account is accurate you still have a few options.

The first option is to insert an explanatory note into your report to explain extenuating circumstances. ChexSystems will allow you to do this by request.  Some member banks might view the note and decide to give you a second chance.  The next option is to pay off the overdraft items and get a release and promise from the merchant or bank that they will report that you have paid off the account.  Finally you can open up a “second chance account.”  A “second chance account” is a bank account where the offering bank has a program to allow you to open a bank account in spite of your ChexSystems history or they do not subscribe at all to ChexSystems. The following website http://www.getsecondchancechecking.com/ has a list of banks that offer “second chance” accounts or that does not subscribe to ChexSystems by state.  Be careful and do your homework before you choose a “second chance” bank.  Some second chance accounts (particularly internet-based companies and banks) will charge exorbitant fees taking advantage of your poor history.  Other “second chance” banks will treat you just the same as any other customer.   You also want to make sure that your “second chance” bank account is FDIC insured.

With a little extra effort you should be able to find a new bank account even where you have had problems or made mistakes in the past.

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Time to Restore Fairness to Student Loan Borrowers

Posted: August 27, 2011 | Author: Sharon Demarque | Filed under: Consumer Protection | Leave a comment »

It’s widely recognized that one of the most reliable means of attaining financial security is through education, including post-secondary education. But we also know that post-secondary education rarely comes cheap. And, in some cases, an educational opportunity that a student is led to believe will put him or her on the track to a better financial future is primarily a way to transfer money from the student or their parents (since they frequently co-sign) to the pockets of the educational institution or private lender  – leaving the student with a load of debt, but without the financial security they were seeking.

In most cases, our society encourages individuals to take risks that they believe will improve their financial prospects. That’s a key rationale for offering bankruptcy protections when things do not turn out as the individual had hoped. For instance, it’s good for us as a society when people are able to borrow money to work on inventions, to start new businesses, to invest in their own home, to go to college, or even to buy the right clothes for the job. But despite our best efforts, sometimes our inventions will not be profitable, our business will fail, our house will lose its value, we won’t be able to finish college or get a good paying job even with our degrees, or we’ll get laid off even though we dress and act professionally at work every day.

Because these outcomes are, at least to some extent, inevitable, it is important to provide those who want to take the risks with some degree of safety if the worst happens. Sure, we could just say “if you want to get the rewards, you have to accept the full weight of the negative consequences too.” But that wouldn’t be good for society as a whole or the individual because it would seriously discourage the risk-taking that is necessary for improvement and growth.

On the other hand, we don’t want to say, take whatever risks you want to and don’t worry about the consequences. Establishing that line is where bankruptcy law (among other things) comes in. Bankruptcy, as most people understand, is not an easy, no consequence, “get out of debt free” card. Most people who consider filing bankruptcy actually take too long weighing the costs and benefits and cause themselves some harm by waiting until later than they should have to file. (For example, they often wait until after they have spent everything in their IRA account, which they could have preserved for retirement in a bankruptcy case.)

So how does that fit in with student loans & bankruptcy? In our society, an education is so crucial to success that almost anyone will be willing to borrow whatever it takes to get a post-secondary education. On the whole, not getting a post-secondary education, unless one has some very special skill or apprenticeship opportunity, poses a more severe risk of financial insecurity than does taking out student loans that one might not be able to repay in the future. However, the undeniable truth is that some students will not be able to repay their student loans – just like some people will not be able to pay the money they borrowed to work on that invention, to buy that home, to start that new business, or to buy that new suit.

However, student loans — even student loans benefiting for-profit private institutions — cannot be discharged in bankruptcy like the debts incurred for all of those other reasons.[fn] Additionally, a person who has substantial student loans is often not even able to repay their student loans through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy repayment plan.

Prior to 2005, the bar on discharging student loans only applied to government loans or private loans funded by non-profit institutions. However, in 2005, that bar was extended to loans made by private lenders and benefiting private, for-profit schools. As the author of an editorial in yesterday’s NY Times (Relief for Student Debtors – NYTimes.com) noted: ”The country has a compelling interest in making it as difficult as possible for student borrowers to elude payment for federal loans. There was no reason for extending that protection to private lenders of student loans.” While, in either case, the inability to discharge student loans can pose an overwhelming hardship, a reasonable distinction exists where the source of the loans was public funds.

Fairness dictates that we put private student loan lenders in the same position as other private lenders – and private student loan borrowers in the same position as other individuals who take out loans from private institutions.  To this end, Senator Dick Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, and Representative Steve Cohen, Democrat of Tennessee, and others have introduced legislation to restore fairness in student lending. You can read more about the proposed legislation here.

fn. There are very rare cases in which courts have permitted discharge of student loans, such as when the debtor is completely disabled and has no prospect of working in the future.

When I interview clients regarding their budget, I find that they often overlook many everyday expenses.  This creates a problem for both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 clients.  In a Chapter 7 context missing expenses may mean that a false conclusion is reached that the client doesn’t qualify for Chapter 7 relief.  Simply put the law requires that a client pay back valid debts to the extent that they are able.  More specifically the court may determine that the debtor has “abused the bankruptcy system” and dismiss their case.  Dismissal of a case based on the idea that it is abusive to the bankruptcy system to let a debtor off the hook that really has the ability to repay their debts has a long history in the bankruptcy law.

This history goes back prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) where various federal several circuit courts of appeals established  per se rules regarding repayment.  Namely, where the debtor with primarily consumer related debts demonstrated the ability to repay their unsecured creditors a meaningful amount of money over time, standing alone, this  was sufficient to constitute abuse.  United States Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir.1992); Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir 1988).

Where abuse was found in the Chapter 7 case the court would order that the case  be either converted to Chapter 13 or dismissed.  In a Chapter 13 case the debtor is required to pay back all of their disposable income to their unsecured creditors for a time period of  three to five years depending on the debtor’s gross income.  So where you have a client who has underestimated or omitted legitimate expenses they invariably have put themselves in the untenable position of having to pay back money into a bankruptcy plan that they really can’t afford based on their necessary expenses.  This means that their bankruptcy plan will fail and their case will end up in an unnecessary dismissal.

After the passage of BAPCPA, Congress codified and quantified the per se rule expressed by the courts in cases like Harris and Kelly.  Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) to this end.  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707 a means test was established to determine eligibility for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  The means test sets forth a statutory basis for determining whether a debtor is making improvident lifestyle choices and if so will limit expenses to a reasonable level as expressed by the Internal Revenue Service expense templates.  If a debtor does not pass the means test (barring compelling special circumstances) they will not qualify to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  So is very important for the attorney to evaluate all of a debtor’s expenses in determining whether they qualify for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Evaluating all of the expenses is not only critical in a Chapter 7 case.  It is also crucial in a Chapter 13 case. In a Chapter 13 case evaluating all of the expenses is important in determining what the required payment will be to the unsecured creditors.  To the extent the expenses are reasonable, again as limited by Internal Revenue Service expense templates and other applicable law, such expenses are deducted from the debtors budget in determining the required payment amount.  As is the case with the Chapter 7, where the Chapter 13 debtor underestimates their expenses they are invariably committing themselves to a bankruptcy payment that they cannot really afford and their bankruptcy plan is doomed to failure.

In conclusion, over many years of practice I have found that clients often tend to omit or underestimate the cost of the following expenses on their budgets:

1.   Bank charges (check printing, monthly checking account and atm fees)

2.    Hair care, nail care, cosmetics, and personal grooming products

3.    Summer camp and summer activities for children

4.    Annual tax return preparation fees

5.    Other accounting fees

6.    School lunches, tuition, activities, books and materials, school uniforms

7.    Ongoing legal fees

8.    Scouting

9.     Pet food, veterinary, pet grooming, pet insurance, and medicine.

10.    Christmas, anniversary and birthday gift

11.    Motor vehicle oil, registration, inspection, smog, tires, parking maintenance, car washes, On star payments, EZ pass costs.

12.    Cigarettes

13.     Un-reimbursed work expenses, shoe shines, uniforms, licensing, education, etc., membership dues in various professional and business organization

14.   Home landscaping and lawn care, HOA dues, pool care, homeowners insurance, home warranty payments, painting

15.   Postage, home office supplies, (computer, toner, ink, paper, software, updates)

16.   Home alarm system maintenance and fees.

17.   Contact lenses and solutions, non-prescription medications, antacids, toothpaste, whiteners, brush and floss, over the counter pain killers, cold and sinus medicine, allergy medicine, vitamins and supplements.

18.   Children’s allowance

19.  Monthly website subscriptions

20.  Gym/ YMCA fees.

21.  Music lessons for children

22.  Batteries

23.   Monthly magazine and newspaper subscriptions.

24.  Visitation costs non custodial and split custody children and travel to care for loved ones, support to family members not living with the debtor(s)

Reviewing the client’s budget is a vitally important part of attorney representation in a consumer bankruptcy case.  This review is best accomplished when the client is prepared.  Being prepared entails careful review of check registers and bank statements for at least twelve months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case. Notes and tallies should be made during the review so that the required information is at the client’s fingertips as the budget is being prepared.  Careful legwork and communication between the attorney and client will help insure a positive outcome in the client’s bankruptcy case.

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